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Frank Jackson’s famous Knowledge Argument moves from the prem-
ise that complete physical knowledge about experiences is not complete 
knowledge about experiences to the falsity of physicalism. Some physi-
calists (e.g., John Perry) have countered by arguing that what Jackson’s 
Mary, the perfect scientist who acquires all physical knowledge about 
experiencing red while being locked in a monochromatic room, lacks be-
fore experiencing red is merely a piece of recognitional knowledge of an 
identity, and that since lacking a piece of recognitional knowledge of an 
identity does not entail lacking any pieces of knowledge of worldly facts, 
physicalism is safe. I will argue that what Mary lacks in her room is not 
merely a piece of recognitional knowledge of an identity and that some 
physicalists have failed to see this because of a failure to appreciate that 
Mary’s epistemic progress when she fi rst experiences red has two differ-
ent stages. While the second epistemic stage can perhaps be plausibly 
considered as acquiring merely a piece of recognitional knowledge of an 
identity, there is good reason to think that the fi rst epistemic stage can-
not be thus considered.
Keywords: The knowledge argument, Frank Jackson, John Perry, 
the phenomenal concept strategy.
1. The Recognitional Strategy
Jackson’s (1982) Knowledge Argument is one of the most intuitively 
compelling arguments against physicalism (roughly, the thesis that 
our world is entirely physical). This famous argument moves from the 
premise that complete physical knowledge about experiences is not 
complete knowledge about experiences to the falsity of physicalism. 
Consider Mary, a perfect scientist who has all the physical knowledge 
about experiencing red and yet who has not experienced red before. 
The intuition is that when Mary leaves her room and sees a ripe to-
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mato, she will be surprised and exclaim “So, this is what it is like to 
see red!”, and  will thus acquire a new piece of information about ex-
periencing red. And, since physicalism implies that given her complete 
physical knowledge, Mary knows everything about experiences of red, 
Jackson argues, physicalism is false.
Some physicalists have countered this argument by arguing that 
what Mary lacks before experiencing red is merely a piece of recogni-
tional knowledge of an identity, and that since lacking a piece of recog-
nitional knowledge of an identity is not, or does not entail, lacking any 
pieces of knowledge about worldly (coarse-grained) facts,1 physicalism 
is safe. Let us call this reply to the Knowledge Argument “the Recog-
nitional Strategy” (briefl y, RS). RS fi nds one of its clearest and most 
systematic expressions in John Perry’s admirable Knowledge, Possibil-
ity, and Consciousness (2001); and, the account offered there will be 
the main focus of this paper, though the lessons that will be drawn 
throughout will be general.
An instructive way to get a better idea of RS is to appeal to an anal-
ogy. Consider the following case from Perry (2001: 119). Perry might 
know that Fred Dretske wrote Knowledge and the Flow of Informa-
tion (KFI) even if he does not know that that (man) [perceptually dem-
onstrating Dretske at a party] wrote KFI. In this case, Perry fails to 
recognize (and hence lacks the recognitional knowledge) that that is 
Dretske. If Perry had known that that is Dretske, he would have in-
ferred that that (man) wrote KFI from his previous knowledge that 
Dretske wrote KFI. However, lacking this piece of knowledge (i.e., that 
that (man) is Dretske) is not, or does not entail, lacking any piece of 
knowledge about worldly facts because Perry already has certain piec-
es of knowledge that have the same worldly content as that piece of 
knowledge (e.g., that Dretske is Dretske). (Similarly, Perry’s coming 
to know “that is Dretske” is merely a matter of coming to recognize an 
identity and cannot thus be thought of as coming to possess any piece 
of knowledge about a new worldly fact.) It seems that if the Knowl-
edge Argument had a valid form, then Perry’s failing to know that that 
(man) is Dretske would entail that that (man) is different from Dretske 
while, ex hypothesi, they are the same.
RS claims that Mary’s entire new knowledge can be expressed by 
“this is what it is like to see red” and also that this piece of knowledge 
is the same in kind as the piece of knowledge Perry comes to possess 
1 It is commonplace to distinguish two different ways of individuating facts. Fine-
grained facts are individuated in terms of the concepts the subject has of the things 
in the world; coarse-grained facts are individuated in a way insensitive to those 
concepts. So, the fact that there is a bottle of water in my backpack and the fact that 
there is a bottle of H2O in my backpack are two different facts if “fact” is understood 
in a fi ne-grained way (since a subject can believe the former without believing the 
latter), but are the same fact if it is understood in a coarse-grained way (since water 
is H2O). When I speak of “worldly facts” or “facts,” what I mean is always coarse-
grained facts.
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when he learns that that is Dretske. “This [Mary’s] new knowledge is”, 
Perry writes, “a case of recognitional or identifi cational knowledge, as 
in the case with my knowledge at the party with Dretske” (2001: 147). 
According to RS, Mary’s coming to know “that is what it is like to see 
red” is merely a matter of coming to recognize an identity and cannot 
thus be thought of as coming to possess any piece of knowledge about 
a worldly fact. Through experiencing red, Mary acquires, RS claims, a 
new recognitional concept (i.e., the one she expresses by “that”) of the 
experience of seeing red she already knew under a physical/function-
al concept in her room; and, accordingly, the new bit of propositional 
knowledge she expresses by exclaiming “that is what it is like to see 
red!” is, it is claimed, merely a piece of recognitional knowledge of an 
identity.2
To make clearer the purported analogy between Jackson’s Mary 
case and Perry’s Dretske case, let us suppose, as Perry (2001: 99) does, 
that the texts Mary reads in her room have systematically named the 
subjective characters (what-it-is-likenesses) of color experiences and 
that QR is defi ned in one of those texts as the subjective character of ex-
periencing red. So, suppose that Mary knows, before leaving her room, 
that QR is what it is like to see red, while she does not know what it 
is like to have an experience with the subjective character QR because 
she did not have an experience with QR. This bit of knowledge is analo-
gous to Perry’s fi rst piece of knowledge about Dretske (i.e., “Dretske 
wrote KFI”) in that just as the latter is “detached from my [Perry’s] 
perception of him [Dretske]” (Perry 2001: 119), the former is detached 
from “an act of attending to a subjective character” (Perry 2001: 147). 
Upon seeing the ripe tomato, Mary comes to know that this is what it 
is like to see red, and this is analogous to Perry’s coming to know, after 
Dretske introduces himself, that that is Dretske. The latter is attached 
to a perception of Dretske and the former to an act of attending to a 
certain subjective character. And, fi nally, combined with her previous 
knowledge, Mary infers that QR is this, where this picks out the red 
experience-type, just as Perry infers from his fi rst and second bits of 
knowledge that that (man) wrote KFI.
According to Perry, the problem Mary’s case poses for physicalism 
is best seen as an instance of the sort of problem Frege called to our 
attention: how can identities be informative? Now, there are (at least 
prima facie) good reasons to think that recognition of an identity does 
not require coming to possess any piece of knowledge of new worldly 
2 Loar also compares Mary’s lack of the relevant piece of knowledge with ordinary 
recognitional failures: “Margot learns about the element Au and reads that people 
decorate themselves with alloys of Au. But she has never seen gold and cannot 
visually identify it: she lacks an adequate visual conception. She later is shown some 
gold and forms a visual conception of it, “that stuff,’ and she acquires a new piece 
of information…to the effect that those previously read about embellishments are 
made of that stuff. [I]f the knowledge argument were unrestrictedly valid, it would 
follow that that stuff is not identical to Au” (2004: 223).
328 E. Demircioglu, Recognitional Identifi cation
facts (and that failure to recognize an identity does not entail failing to 
possess any piece of knowledge of new worldly facts). When Perry fails 
to recognize that that [demonstrating Dretske] is Dretske, he does not 
thereby fail to know about a worldly fact; and, accordingly, if he recog-
nizes that that is Dretske, he does not thereby come to know about a 
new worldly fact. This is again because that that is Dretske is the same 
worldly fact as that Dretske is Dretske, and the latter is something 
Perry already knows about. The basic idea here is simply that worldly 
facts can be represented (or conceived) in many different ways and, in 
order for a subject to know about a certain worldly fact, it is not neces-
sary that she has access to all those different ways of representing (or 
conceiving) it. New knowledge does not necessarily involve knowledge 
of new facts.3
In what follows, I will simply grant for the sake of  argument that 
failure to recognize an identity does not entail failing to possess any 
piece of knowledge of new worldly facts. I will argue against RS that 
what Mary lacks in her room is not merely a piece of recognitional 
knowledge of an identity and also that some physicalists have failed to 
see this because of a failure to appreciate that Mary’s entire epistemic 
progress when she fi rst experiences red has two different stages: while 
the second stage of her epistemic progress can be plausibly considered 
as acquiring a piece of recognitional knowledge of an identity, there 
is good reason to think that the fi rst epistemic stage cannot be thus 
considered.4
This paper is hereafter divided into three sections. In section 2, I 
will briefl y describe Nida-Rümelin’s (2004) Marianna case and contrast 
it with Mary’s case to show that there are indeed two different epistem-
ic stages in question–the one that is shared by Mary and Marianna and 
the one that is had only by Mary. In section 3, I will argue that, con-
tra Nida-Rümelin, Marianna’s epistemic progress is propositional and 
also that there are indeed two knowledge arguments, rather than one, 
3 How should we understand the epistemic progress that Perry makes when he 
recognizes the identity in question? I take it for granted that an adequacy constraint 
on such an account is that it does not postulate or entail that the fact that Jameson 
is Jameson is different from the fact that that is Jameson. As is well-known, Frege’s 
own solution to the problem of the cognitive signifi cance of (some) recognitions of 
identities was to introduce “modes of presentation” but not to postulate further 
worldly facts: “Now if we were to regard equality [or identity] as a relation between 
that which the names ‘a’ and ‘b’ designate, it would seem that a = b could not differ 
from a = a (i.e. provided a = b is true)…A difference [between a = a and a = b] can 
arise only if the difference between the signs [‘a’ and ‘b’] corresponds to a difference 
in the mode of presentation of that which is designated” (Frege 1993: 23–4).
4 I do not claim any originality in arguing for the existence of two different epistemic 
stages (see Nida-Rümelin (2004)) or in holding that the fi rst epistemic stage is not a 
matter of acquiring a piece of recognitional knowledge of an identity (see Stalnaker 
(2008)). The present essay aims to contribute to the literature by providing a clear 
account of the nature of the two epistemic stages and an answer to the question 
of why the fi rst epistemic stage is not an acquisition of a piece of knowledge of an 
identity. See also fn. 19.
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which can be distinguished with reference to the two items of knowl-
edge that someone situated in a monochromatic environment lacks. In 
section 4, I will argue that Mary’s extra epistemic progress is, while 
the epistemic progress shared by Mary and Marianna is not, a matter 
of recognizing an identity.
2. Nida-Rümelin’s Marianna
Some misunderstandings regarding the nature and content of the new 
knowledge Mary gains after her release can be avoided by recogniz-
ing that there are different epistemic stages one might undergo in the 
process of obtaining information about experiences. When it comes to 
pointing out these differences, Nida-Rümelin’s Marianna case (2004) 
is more helpful than Jackson’s Mary. Like Mary, Marianna lives her 
entire life in a monochromatic environment. The central difference is, 
however, that when the happy day comes, rather than seeing ripe to-
matoes and bananas and grass and the sky, she is randomly visually 
presented with four slides showing clear cases of blue, red, green and 
yellow but she is not told the names of the colors. Now Marianna does 
not know which of the four types of color experiences she has is, say, 
red nor does she know that having red experiences5 is like that, where 
the indexical in question picks out the type of experience she has when 
presented with the red slide.6 But still one can plausibly say that now 
that she has the experience of red, there is a clear sense in which she 
knows what it is like to see red.
One may object that there is a sense in which Marianna does not 
know what it is like to see red because she cannot identify red experi-
ences as red experiences and knowing what it is like to see red requires 
such a recognitional ability: when she experiences the red slide, she is 
not in a position to recognize that she experiences red and justifi ably 
verbally report “that is red.” Does this mean that she does not know, 
in any epistemically respectable sense of the term, what it is like to 
see red? No, it only suggests that I should specify more carefully what 
I mean when I claim that after her red experience, Marianna knows 
what it is like to see red. What I mean is this: Marianna knows what 
it is like to have this, where this picks out the red experience-type. 
Marianna’s gaining this piece of information is analogous to the case 
5 I take it as a plausible hypothesis that the sense in which experiences are red is 
not the sense in which physical objects are red. So, phenomenal redness is different 
from physical redness (see Chalmers (2004)). At this point, one may follow Peacocke 
(1983: 21) and introduce a primed predicate (e.g., red′) to pick out the phenomenal 
property of the visual experience that is normally produced by the presence of a red 
object. For convenience, I will not adopt this line and simply use unprimed predicates 
to characterize the experiences in question.
6 For an account of how demonstrative terms can refer to types rather than tokens, 
see Levine (2010). For further discussion about how type-demonstratives bear on 
the Knowledge Argument, see Demircioglu (2012), Levin (2007), Loar (2004), and 
Perry (2001).
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in which Perry has a little chat with Dretske at a party without rec-
ognizing him as Dretske and hence without knowing that, referring to 
him, that is Dretske. There is a sense in which Perry knows the man 
he meets even if he lacks the recognitional knowledge that, pointing at 
the person he meets, that is Dretske.
Marianna’s case shows that there is an intermediate epistemic 
stage which goes unnoticed in Mary’s case.7 It seems intuitively plau-
sible that Marianna learns something new when she is haphazardly 
shown different colors and hence she makes a sort of epistemic prog-
ress. However, she still misses the information that this is what it is 
like to see red, where this picks out the type of experience she has when 
she is presented with the red slide. There is still room for Marianna to 
make further epistemic progress because she experiences red without 
knowing that what she experiences is red.
3. Two Knowledge Arguments
An interesting question about Marianna’s case is whether the epistem-
ic progress she makes gives her the relevant item of knowledge which 
is crucial for the Knowledge Argument to work. After having the rel-
evant visual experiences, Marianna evidently gains epistemic access to 
various new thought contents that are not available to her before. She 
is now in a position, for instance, to wonder whether ripe apples appear 
like that or that, where the indexicals respectively refer to the colors of 
the red and blue slides, and to entertain new hypotheses and make new 
guesses. What explains the fact that Marianna gains epistemic access 
to new thought contents is that she now knows what it is like to see red, 
blue, etc. Can an argument analogous to the original Knowledge Argu-
ment from Mary’s case work in Marianna’s case? Or does the property 
dualist need a further step of epistemic progress to make a viable case 
for the intended metaphysical conclusion—the falsity of physicalism?
Despite her new ability to entertain the corresponding thought, 
Marianna does not come to know that ripe apples appear like the red 
slide she has the experience of. Nevertheless, does she acquire any 
item of propositional knowledge? Through her color experiences, she 
knows what it is like to see red; but it is not clear whether this piece 
of knowledge raises any threat to physicalism because it is not clear 
that this knowledge has any propositional content, which can be ex-
pressed in  propositional form by a suitable that-clause.8 According to 
7 As Nida-Rümelin writes: “A disadvantage of Jackson’s example is that it fails to 
distinguish two steps of epistemic progress that can be distinguished clearly in 
Marianna’s case” (2004: 254). However, as will become clear, I do not agree with 
Nida-Rümelin’s construal of the fi rst epistemic stage of Mary’s progress.
8 The assumption here is that the kind of knowledge that is relevant to the Knowledge 
Argument is propositional, that is, that the Knowledge Argument purports to pose 
a threat against physicalism only if the kind of knowledge that is acquired through 
experiencing red is propositional. This assumption is supported by the idea that 
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Nida-Rümelin, Marianna “has not gained any new item of the relevant 
propositional knowledge” (2004: 254) and hence there is nothing imper-
iling physicalism at this stage of her epistemic progress. After all, one 
may ask what form the relevant proposition can possibly be given since 
she does not know that that is what it is like to see red, where that picks 
out the relevant type of color experience. 
However, contra Nida-Rümelin, the following construal of Marian-
na’s knowledge regarding what it is like to see red appears plausible:
(P) Marianna knows that it is like Q to have this (where this picks 
out the red experience-type).9
After being shown the red slide, Marianna acquires a new phenomenal 
concept, which is Q, that picks out the phenomenal quality (or subjec-
tive character) instantiated by experiencing red in a way different in 
kind from the concepts she had before.10 It is controversial whether 
there really are phenomenal concepts that satisfy the characteristics 
they are thought to have (e.g., conceptual independence from physical/
functional concepts or having their referents in their modes of presen-
tation (Loar 2004)); but, for the purposes of this paper, their existence 
can be harmlessly taken for granted because the explanation the pro-
ponents of the recognitional reply to the Knowledge Argument give for 
the epistemic progress in question rests essentially on their attributing 
to the subject the acquisition of those concepts.11
physicalism is the thesis that every fact is a physical fact and propositional knowledge 
is knowledge of facts. (It is widely assumed that if the bit of knowledge that Marianna 
acquires through seeing red is, for instance, merely a piece of knowing-how, then it 
is not problematic for physicalism (see Lewis (2004)) and hence it can be plausibly 
ignored for the purposes of the Knowledge Argument. So, showing that there is a 
certain epistemic stage that goes unnoticed in Mary’s case is not enough: one needs 
also to show that that epistemic stage is also propositional in character.)
9 See Lycan (1996: 93) for a proposal along the similar lines. I adopt (P) instead of, 
e.g., (R) Marinna knows that this experience is Q or (S) Marianna knows that Q is 
what it is like to have this experience or some other proposition, because (P) is what 
one gets if one follows the general recipe of transforming “know wh-…” constructions 
into “know that” constructions (see below). However, I will sometimes make use 
also of (R) or (S) when it is more convenient to do so. But nothing essential in my 
discussion hangs on this choice.
10 Chalmers (2010: 267–8) calls the concept Q a direct phenomenal concept (and 
the belief that it is like Q to have this experience a direct phenomenal belief). On 
Chalmers’ account, the concept this that Mary employs to pick out the red experience-
type is a demonstrative concept under which that experience-type is conceived as 
the object of her demonstration. Since, on this account, conceiving an experience-
type under a demonstrative concept is not thereby conceiving it as having a quality 
picked out by a direct phenomenal concept (in our case, Q), (P) turns out to be a 
substantive piece of knowledge that is neither a priori nor analytic. This section of 
the present paper is much indebted to Chalmers’ account.
11 Chalmers (2002) makes a useful distinction between Type-A materialists and 
Type-B materialists. Type-B materialists argue, while Type-A materialists deny, 
that there is an epistemic gap between physical/functional truths and phenomenal 
truths (and, of course, they both deny that there is a corresponding ontological 
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How does Marianna come to entertain, through experiencing red, 
the proposition that it is like Q to have this, where this picks out the 
red experience-type? A natural suggestion is this. Marianna has a red 
experience when she is presented with the slide. She then attends to it 
and forms the phenomenal concept Q that picks out the red experience-
type.12 And, by predicating the concept Q of the very experience she 
has, she forms the belief that it is like Q to have this, demonstrating 
the red experience-type in question.
Thinking Marianna’s new piece of knowledge in terms of (P) is sup-
ported by certain syntactic and semantic relations between the senten-
tial constructions “S knows wh-…” and “S knows that…” For instance, 
“Jack knows who Mary is” is true in virtue of Jack’s knowing that Mary 
is so-and-so, and “Susan knows where Hector is” is true in virtue of Su-
san’s knowing that Hector is in such-and-such place. A plausible idea is 
that Marianna’s knowledge can be viewed as a special case which can 
be assimilated to this general scheme: Marianna knows what it is like 
to see red in virtue of knowing that it is like Q to have this, demonstrat-
ing a red experience.13
I would like to make two points regarding the nature of the new piece 
of knowledge captured by (P). First, the new knowledge in question is 
not to be confused with the stipulative sort of knowledge Marianna 
might acquire upon getting acquainted with the phenomenal quality 
instantiated by experiencing red. Marianna might simply call the phe-
nomenal quality she experiences  ‘Q’ and acquire the piece of knowl-
edge expressed by the sentence “I name this quality ‘Q’.” It is clear that 
gap). Type-B materialists account for the existence of the alleged epistemic gap by 
reference to the special epistemic and semantic properties of phenomenal concepts. 
This is what is also known as “the Phenomenal Concept Strategy” (PCS) in the 
literature. The proponents of the recognitional reply to the Knowledge Argument 
are Type-B materialists in Chalmers’ sense. Perry (2001) explicitly argues that 
the recognitional progress Mary makes through having red experiences is partly a 
matter of acquiring a new phenomenal concept of having red experiences. See also 
Tye (2000). I will specify how what I have to say about RS bears on PCS in general 
in the fi nal section of the paper.
12 Surely concept formation is a much more complex process than merely attending to 
the qualities in the subject’s view. However such complexities need not concern us in 
this paper and the very rough account sketched above will suffi ce for our purposes.
13 Rosenthal writes: “Knowing ‘wh’ abstracts from the full content of one’s knowledge; 
one knows what something is only if one knows that it’s an F” (2004: 193). It is also 
worth noting that the locution “it is like” in (P) does not mean “it resembles” just as 
the locution “it is like” does not mean “it resembles” in the context of “what it is like 
to see red.” Nagel writes: “[The] analogical form of the English expression “what it 
is like” is misleading. It does not mean “what (in our experience) it resembles,” but 
rather ‘how it is for the subject himself.’” (1974: 440, fn. 6). Reading “what it is like” 
as “what it resembles” is what Lewis (2004) calls “the fi rst way to miss the point” 
of the Knowledge Argument among the six ways it specifi es. The sense in which 
Marianna does not know what it is like to see red before she is presented with the 
red slide is the same as the sense in which she does not know, before she is presented 
with the red slide, that it is like Q to have this, demonstrating the experience-type 
in question.
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the knowledge thus expressed does not pose any threat to physical-
ism. However, the new piece of knowledge expressed by the that-clause 
in (P) does not concern a “merely linguistic” fact but a worldly fact 
about her experience of seeing red. That piece of knowledge is acquired 
through predicating the novel concept Q of her experience and it is 
not relevantly different from the pieces of knowledge Marianna can ac-
quire through predicating that concept to her subsequent experiences 
of seeing red. The fact that the token of the experience-type of seeing 
red through the having of which Marianna acquires the concept Q is 
the same as the token experience of which she predicates that concept 
should not obscure the point that the new knowledge she acquires does 
not concern a fact about her decision regarding the use of language but 
a fact about her experience.
Second, in order for (P) to pose a challenge to RS, it must be shown 
that the piece of knowledge that is expressed by the that-clause it con-
tains is not knowledge of an identity (Recall that RS claims that the 
novel piece of knowledge acquired through seeing red is knowledge of 
an identity and as such does not threaten physicalism). In the next 
section, I will argue that the piece of knowledge captured by (P) is not 
knowledge of an identity. For the moment, however, I wish to argue 
that Chalmers’ construal of Perry’s account as an attempt “to analyze 
phenomenal knowledge as a sort of indexical knowledge” (2004: 184) 
obscures much of the point of RS. Chalmers argues that Perry thinks 
that the only sort of concept that can be acquired through experiencing 
is a demonstrative concept that functions to pick out whatever sort of 
experience one is currently attending to. According to Chalmers, there 
are also non-demonstrative “qualitative concepts of experiences” (2004: 
185), which can be acquired through experiencing and are involved 
by the crucial new knowledge that the knowledge argument turns on. 
By a qualitative concept of an experience, Chalmers means the same 
sort of concept as Q involved by (P).14 Chalmers argues that Perry’s (or 
more generally RS’s) failure to recognize qualitative concepts such as 
Q results in his (or its) exclusive focus on “the relatively uninteresting 
indexical knowledge” (2004: 185) that the experience usually caused by 
red things is this, where this is a demonstrative concept of red experi-
ences. For Chalmers, “the substantive, non-trivial” (2004: 185) knowl-
edge that the experience usually caused by red things is Q (Chalmers’ 
candidate for the crucial new knowledge central to the knowledge argu-
ment) is simply neglected by Perry and RS.
There are a couple of points I would like to make on behalf of RS. 
First, RS need not and does not deny that there are qualitative concepts 
of experiences that can be acquired through experiencing. In his re-
sponse to Chalmers, Perry emphatically puts  it that Chalmers’ demon-
strative concepts are “not my [his] candidate for Mary’s [new] concept” 
(2004: 219) and that “in thinking of the experience in this new way, 
14 See fn. 10 above.
334 E. Demircioglu, Recognitional Identifi cation
she is not thinking of it as ‘this experience’” (2004: 221). Accordingly, 
RS need not and does not deny that there are substantive (cognitively 
signifi cant) pieces of knowledge that can be acquired through experi-
encing. According to RS, just as one’s coming to know, after Dretske 
introduces himself, that that is Dretske, involves a substantive piece of 
knowledge, what one might acquire through experiencing might simi-
larly involve a substantive piece of knowledge. This is because new 
knowledge can be substantive without necessarily involving knowledge 
of new facts. Second, the central point of RS is that the crucial substan-
tive piece of knowledge acquired through experiencing, the new knowl-
edge involving qualitative concepts, is knowledge of an identity and as 
such does not pose any threat to physicalism. No purported objection to 
RS that does not explicitly counter this very point gets off the ground. 
An interesting result appears to follow if (P) captures what Mari-
anna comes to know after having red experiences. There are indeed two 
knowledge arguments, rather than one, which can be distinguished 
with reference to the two items of knowledge that someone situated in 
a monochromatic environment from birth appears to lack. First, such a 
person lacks the piece of knowledge expressed by the that-clause in (P): 
the knowledge that it is like Q to have this, where this picks out a red 
experience-type. The fi rst Knowledge Argument runs roughly like this: 
One who knows everything physical there is to know may still lack the 
knowledge that it is like Q to have this, where this picks out a red expe-
rience-type, and hence physicalism is false. Second, she  also lacks the 
knowledge that Q is what it is like to see red. The second Knowledge 
Argument goes roughly like this: One who knows everything physical 
there is to know may still lack the knowledge that Q is what it is like to 
see red, and hence physicalism is false.
Having the second piece of knowledge mentioned above implies hav-
ing the fi rst but not vice versa. Just like the fi rst piece of knowledge, the 
second piece of knowledge intuitively requires having an experience 
of seeing red. But there is more to the second item of knowledge than 
what is required to have the fi rst. Through her experience of the red 
slide, Marianna knows that it is like Q to have this, where this picks 
out the red experience-type, but does not know that Q is what it is like 
to see red; while through her experience of ripe tomatoes, Mary knows 
both. The difference between the two stems from the fact that unlike 
Mary, Marianna is not in a position to recognize her red experience-
token as an instance of the red experience-type because such a recogni-
tion requires either having experiences of paradigmatically red objects 
like ripe tomatoes or being told by others that pointing at the red slide, 
that is red, or something to that effect.
A suggestive model which explains how Mary happens to recognize 
her experience of red as an experience of red goes like this: when Mary 
sees ripe tomatoes, she learns that it is like Q to have this, where this 
picks out the red experience-type. What is common to Mary and Mari-
anna’s cases is this stage of epistemic progress. However, Mary also 
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knows that what she sees are ripe tomatoes (after all, she can tell by 
the way they look to her), and combined with her knowledge that her 
perceptual apparatus works normally and ripe tomatoes induce red ex-
periences in normal perceivers, she infers that this is an experience of 
red.15 Hence, she gains an item of knowledge which Marianna lacks.
The fact that the item of knowledge that Mary and Marianna both 
acquire upon experiencing red is propositional is important because 
that means that that item of knowledge, as I have argued, can be prop-
erly deployed in a knowledge argument against physicalism. Hence if 
RS fails to account for that item of knowledge then it cannot be con-
sidered as a tenable physicalist reply to that argument. In the follow-
ing section, I will argue that the fi rst epistemic stage that Mary and 
Marianna both go through is not, or does not consist in, recognition 
of an identity and hence RS cannot account for the item of knowledge 
acquired at that stage.
4. The Nature of the Two Epistemic Stages
Before addressing the question of whether the fi rst epistemic stage con-
sists in recognition of an identity, the question I want to raise is this: 
what exactly is it that Mary knows in addition to what she and Mari-
anna both know about the experience of red? How substantive is the 
extra epistemic progress Mary makes, that is, does she come to know 
a new fact about the world Marianna does not know? I think these are 
the questions RS can be properly interpreted as addressing. Let us con-
sider the following more closely:
(1) Q is what it is like to have this experience.
(2) QR is what it is like to see red.
(1) is uttered by Marianna when she is shown the red slide. And, sup-
pose that she also knows (2) when she is in her room: she knows that 
there is something it is like to see red, and her textbooks call it ‘QR’.16 
What she does not know is:
15 One may argue that Mary’s knowledge is non-inferential because she does not go 
through any conscious inferential process in her mind. I am inclined to reply that 
there are unconscious inferences as well as conscious ones and Mary’s inference 
can be the former if not the latter. Nothing much hangs on this, however. What 
is important is that there are different stages of epistemic progress in the cases 
specifi ed and we need an account which explains how one passes from one stage to 
another.
16 One may question whether we can reasonably build the assumption that Mary 
learns about the subjective character of seeing red, QR, into our formulation of the 
knowledge argument. Rosenthal writes: “Unless we’ve established independently 
that QR is itself physical, Mary’s learning about it may well be learning about 
something physical…Only if we’ve shown that QR is physical can Mary’s textbooks 
teach her about it. It’s question begging to build that assumption into our formulation 
of the knowledge argument” (2004: 195–6). The anti-materialist requires, Rosenthal 
argues, that Mary’s textbook knowledge be exclusively physical, and if QR is non-
physical, then Mary learns about something non-physical in her room and this 
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(3) Q is QR.17
On the other hand, Mary knows (3) in virtue of knowing that this (the 
experience type demonstrated by her and Marianna) is a red experi-
ence. That is, what she knows but Marianna does not know is the fol-
lowing:
(4) This is a red experience.
RS argues for two distinct claims: fi rst, (4) is a piece of recognitional 
knowledge of an identity; second, failing to recognize identities does not 
have ontological costs: just as Perry’s failing to know, demonstrating 
Dretske that that is Dretske is merely a failure to recognize an iden-
tity and thus does not have any ontological implications, Marianna’s 
failing to know (4) is failing to recognize an identity and thus does 
not have any ontological implications. RS holds that Marianna already 
knows a fact identical to the fact expressed by (4) in some other way 
(for instance, she knows that a red experience is a red experience) just 
as Perry knows a fact identical to the fact that that [demonstrating 
Dretske] is Dretske in some other way (for instance, he knows that 
Dretske is Dretske).18
obscures any new non-physical knowledge she might get on fi rst consciously seeing 
red. I think this is a reasonable worry about Perry’s formulation of the knowledge 
argument, and if, as Rosenthal suggests, Mary cannot learn about QR in her room, 
then Perry’s thesis that Mary’s new knowledge is knowledge of an identity does 
not even get off the ground. I grant in this paper that Mary can learn about QR in 
her room, and I will show that granting even this much does not save RS. See also 
Perry’s (2004) response to Rosenthal.
17 It is worth making a point that supplements my discussion in the previous 
section of Chalmers’ infl uential interpretation of RS. (3) captures what Mary comes 
to know after seeing paradigmatically red objects. Indeed, the content of (3) is one of 
Perry’s candidates for the content of Mary’s crucial new knowledge (see Perry (2001, 
chap. 7: 145–50)). If this is so, then RS cannot viewed as an attempt to assimilate 
phenomenal knowledge to indexical knowledge given that there are no demonstrative 
concepts involved in (3).
18 One may wonder how Perry accounts for the cognitive signifi cance of identities 
such as (3) and (4). Perry argues that in order to appreciate the cognitive signifi cance 
of identities, one must reject “the subject matter assumption,” according to which 
“the rational content of a belief is the conditions its truth puts on the subject matter 
of the belief, the objects the notions and concepts in the belief are of” (113–4). 
However, rejecting the subject matter assumption is, Perry argues, not rejecting the 
notion of content. In fact, for Perry, we need not jettison content but discover more 
of it, i.e., we need different kinds of truth-conditions (which he calls “refl exive truth-
conditions”) as a part of the rational content of a belief in order to account for the 
cognitive signifi cance of beliefs about identities. Refl exive truth-conditions are, as 
Perry defi nes them, not merely conditions on the subject matter but “conditions on 
the utterances or thoughts themselves” (21). By appealing to refl exive contents, Perry 
tells us, we can capture differences in contents of beliefs that are not captured by 
holding the subject matter assumption. The merits of Perry’s “refl exive-referential 
account of content” for the cognitive signifi cance of identities need not be assessed in 
this paper because the piece of knowledge that is really problematic for physicalism 
is, as I will argue, not of an identity.
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In order to argue against RS, one need not raise objections against 
the account it provides for the epistemic progress Mary makes when 
she gets the information in (4). This is because an attempt to under-
stand Mary’s entire epistemic progress in terms of acquiring a piece of 
recognitional knowledge of an identity rests essentially on a failure to 
distinguish different pieces of knowledge Mary gains when she sees ripe 
tomatoes: the one that she shares with Marianna and the other one 
she has but Marianna lacks. The latter might be a bit of recognitional 
knowledge of an identity and hence be devoid of ontological implications; 
but, as I will now argue, the former is not recognition of an identity and 
hence that RS cannot account for the fi rst epistemic stage.19
What are the conditions under which a piece of recognitional knowl-
edge of an identity is acquired? A natural suggestion is this. A condi-
tion for a given subject to acquire a piece of recognitional knowledge 
of an identity is that she has (at least) two concepts of the same thing. 
The acquisition of recognitional knowledge of an identity occurs when 
the subject recognizes that there is only one thing, rather than two, her 
concepts are about. Perry acquires a piece of recognitional knowledge of 
an identity upon his recognition that this (person) and Dretske are not 
two different things but one and the same thing. This is also what hap-
pens to Mary when, at the second epistemic stage, she recognizes that 
Q and QR are not two different things but one and the same thing.
Now does anything like Mary’s recognition that there is only 
one thing, rather than two, her concepts are about occur at the fi rst 
epistemic stage? I think the answer is defi nitely “No.” Nothing like rec-
ognizing an identity occurs at the fi rst epistemic stage because, at that 
stage, Mary does not recognize that Q is QR, and recognizing that Q is 
QR (what else?) is what Mary has to do if she is to be conceived as ac-
quiring a piece of recognitional knowledge of an identity.
One may reasonably raise the question of what sort of information 
Mary acquires at the fi rst epistemic stage if it is not a piece of recog-
nitional knowledge of an identity. I think the answer to this question 
is already implicit in the account given in the previous section. What 
Mary learns at the fi rst epistemic stage is that the experience-type that 
is referred to by her demonstrative concept this has a certain quality, 
one which is referred to by her novel concept Q. There is no recognition 
of an identity here but recognition that the experience-type that is con-
19 Stalnaker also holds that there are indeed two different epistemic stages Mary 
goes through upon seeing a ripe tomato and raises doubts as to whether RS is 
properly applicable to the fi rst epistemic stage. He writes: “It is at stage one that the 
problematic cognitive achievement—the learning “what it is like” to see red − takes 
place. But it is at stage two…that Mary receives information that this color is red, 
the information that is analogous to the information that Perry received, that this 
person is Dretske. So even if the analogy could help to explain what is learned at 
stage two, it is not clear that this would be relevant to the original puzzle.” (2008: 44) 
However, Stalnaker does not go far enough to make a defi nite claim that RS cannot 
account for the fi rst epistemic stage and hence leaves unanswered the question of 
why it cannot account for that stage.
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ceived by Mary as the object of her demonstration has a certain quality, 
which is non-demonstratively conceived as Q. The piece of knowledge 
Mary shares with Marianna is recognitional because the concept Q is a 
recognitional concept, which she deploys to introspectively identify her 
red experiences, and also because correct applications of recognitional 
concepts yield recognitional knowledge. However, not all recognitions 
are recognitions of identities: some are recognitions of property-instan-
tiations. And it is the latter type of recognition under which Mary’s 
progress at the fi rst epistemic stage falls.
Typically, perceptual experiences have many properties. A given 
perceptual experience might have, for instance, the property of being 
caused by red things under such and such circumstances, the property 
of being the favorite experience of most people located in such and such 
part of the world, the property of having such and such beliefs as ef-
fects, and so on. In addition to all these relational properties, the per-
ceptual experience in question might have a specifi c subjective charac-
ter, a qualitative feature in virtue of which there is something it is like 
to undergo that experience. The phenomenal concept Q involved in (P) 
is a concept of the qualitative feature of the experience of seeing red, 
a novel concept that Mary acquires through having that experience. 
Mary gains a special sort of access to the property picked out by Q in 
virtue of having the experience of seeing red, which is what explains 
its novelty.20 Of course, a commitment to special access does not entail, 
without further argument, a commitment to unique access. More spe-
cifi cally, it does not entail without further argument that the property 
picked out by Q cannot be picked out by the concepts Mary acquires in 
her room. Indeed, the concept QR that Perry stipulates is had by Mary 
while she is still in her room is designed to pick out whatever Q picks 
out. However, as I have argued above, no recognition of the identity 
that Q is QR occurs at the fi rst stage of Mary’s entire epistemic prog-
ress, and no other identity seems relevant. The fi rst epistemic stage is 
rather to be characterized by Mary’s predicating the novel concept Q, 
which is of the qualitative feature of the experience of seeing red, of the 
experience she undergoes. If this is so, Mary’s fi rst-stage knowledge 
does not have the form ‘x is y’ but the form ‘x is an F’. 
A question in the vicinity that calls for an answer is this: how does 
my objection to RS bear on the prospects of the Phenomenal Concept 
Strategy (PCS) in general?21 As I see it, RS can be plausibly considered 
as a version of PCS since it subscribes to the central claim of PCS that 
there are some special, phenomenal concepts of experiences (or their 
subjective characters) the acquisition of which is not guaranteed by the 
acquisition of physical concepts. However, RS also makes the further 
20 Perry writes: “[T]here is a way of attending to a subjective character that is 
possible only when one is having an experience of which it is the subjective character” 
(2001: 145).
21 See fn. 11.
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claim that the knowledge that characterizes Mary’s entire epistemic 
progress is knowledge of an identity, something like ‘Q is QR’. This is 
what distinguishes RS from other (and perhaps more popular) versions 
of PCS. This further claim about the form of the crucial new knowledge 
Mary acquires through experiencing is not essential to PCS. A non-RS 
version of PCS can consistently claim that the knowledge in question 
is of the form ‘x is an F’ while holding that concepts Q and QR pick out 
the same property. That is, such a version might hold that it is true 
that Q is QR without claiming that knowledge of this truth character-
izes Mary’s crucial new knowledge (or her entire epistemic progress). 
The objection that I develop against RS in this paper is not, and is not 
intended as, an objection to a non-RS version of PCS conceived along 
those lines.22
To sum up the upshot of the paper: once the two epistemic stages 
one might undergo through experiencing red are clearly distinguished, 
it is easy to see that Mary’s entire epistemic progress cannot be under-
stood merely as coming to recognize an identity. Since the fi rst stage 
of the entire epistemic progress in question involves a piece of propo-
sitional knowledge that is not knowledge of an identity, RS fails as a 
response to the knowledge argument.23
References
Chalmers, D. 2002. “Consciousness and its place in nature”. In D. Chal-
mers (Ed.). Philosophy of Mind. New York: Oxford University Press: 
247–272.
Chalmers, D. 2004. “Phenomenal concepts and the knowledge argument”. 
In P. Ludlow, Y. Nagasawa, and D. Stoljar (Eds.). There is something 
about Mary. Cambridge: MIT Press: 269–298.
Chalmers, D. 2010. The character of consciousness. Oxford: Oxford Univer-
sity Press.
Demircioglu, E. 2012. “Physicalism and phenomenal concepts”. Philosophi-
cal Studies 165 (1): 257–277.
Frege, G. 1993. “On sense and reference”. Originally published 1892. In 
A. W. Moore (Ed.). Meaning and Reference. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press: 23–43.
Jackson, F. 1982. “Epiphenomenal qualia”. Philosophical Quarterly 32: 
127–136.
Levin, J. 2007. “What is a phenomenal concept?” In T. Alter and S. Walter 
(Eds.). Phenomenal concepts and phenomenal knowledge. New York: Ox-
ford University Press: 145–167.
Levine, J. 2010. “Demonstrative thought”. Mind and Language 25 (2): 
169–195.
22 For an attack against non-RS versions of PCS, see Demircioglu (2012).
23 I would like to thank İlhan İnan, Steven Voss and two anonymous reviewers 
of Croatian Journal of Philosophy for their comments on the earlier version of this 
paper.
340 E. Demircioglu, Recognitional Identifi cation
Lewis, D. 2004. “What experience teaches”. Originally published 1988. In 
P. Ludlow, Y. Nagasawa, & D. Stoljar (Eds.). There is something about 
Mary. Cambridge: MIT Press.
Loar, B. 2004. “Phenomenal states”. Originally published 1990/7. In P. 
Ludlow, Y. Nagasawa, & D. Stoljar (Eds.). There is something about Mary. 
Cambridge: MIT Press: 219–239.
Lycan, W. 1996. Consciousness and experience. Cambridge: MIT Press.
Nagel, T. 1974. “What is it like to be a bat?” Philosophical Review 83 (4): 
435–450.
Nida-Rümelin, M. 2004. “What Mary couldn’t know”. Originally published 
1995. In P. Ludlow, Y. Nagasawa, & D. Stoljar (Eds.). There is something 
about Mary. Cambridge: MIT Press: 219–241.
Peacocke, C. 1983. Sense and content. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Perry, J. 2001. Knowledge, possibility, and consciousness. Cambridge: MIT 
Press.
Rosenthal, D. 2004. “Subjective character and refl exive content”. Philoso-
phy and Phenomenological Research, 68 (1): 191–198.
Stalnaker, R. 2008. Our Knowledge of the Internal World. Oxford Univer-
sity Press.
Tye, M. 2000. Color, consciousness and content. Cambridge: MIT Press.
